TOWARDS A CUSTOMARY CRYSTALLIZATION OF ANTI-DEBRIS
NORMS?

A. CHAZELLE

Corresponding Author: University Toulouse-capitole, Toulouse, France, alexandre.chazelle@ut-capitole.fr

 

Introduction (1)

The article by Donald J. Kesseler and Burton G. Cour-Palais (2) highlighted the issue of space debris. Published in 1978, 46 years later, the eponymous syndrome is on the verge of realization (3) without any real legal solutions being implemented. However, the problem is now known, documented, and even beginning to be publicized. Technical solutions have also been proposed, but the issue remains unchanged.
The first technically mature solution is based on the sobriety and responsibility of space operators. It may not be the most popular. It seeks to avoid abusing orbits by multiplying satellite launches, sometimes of relatively low quality. The other, more technologically advanced but still immature solution would involve space cleaners. This solution is not yet available but could be an interesting option in the medium term (4). This article will focus on the first solution and try to answer how legal experts could assist engineers in developing sobriety in orbital uses.
The first efforts to develop sobriety in orbital uses date back to 1987 (5) with what would become the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). The IADC’s mission was to formalize technical standards to combat space debris (6). These technical standards have been extremely successful. They have been adopted by other standardization (7) bodies and even national legislation(8) . They have also inspired a resolution by the United Nations General Assembly (9).
Today, the rules resulting from the IADC’s work are everywhere. In 2023, COPUOS, at the initiative of Germany, Canada, and the Czech Republic, even proposed compiling national measures against space debris. The report (10) compiled from voluntary state contributions lists the national measures against debris. It should be noted that the report only considers contributions from states that wished to participate. China, one of the IADC’s founding members, did not respond to COPUOS’s requests. Despite these notable absences, the report shows an international consensus around the fight against space debris (11).
The difficulty is that despite the international consensus around anti-debris norms, states continue to view them as optional. In its 2023 resolution «on International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space», the United Nations General Assembly noted «with satisfaction that some Member States are already voluntarily implementing measures to reduce space debris» (12). This is paradoxical because states refuse to apply technical standards to themselves that they make legally binding for their space operators, as evidenced by the French case (13).
This state of affairs aligns quite well with Diane P. Wood’s predictions regarding the evolution of space environmental regulation (14). She described several models: one based on (1) laissez-faire (15), (2) another on national legislation (16), and (3) the last on a multilateral framework (17). Interestingly, she also noted that spontaneous and national regulations would likely be achieved, but obtaining multilateral consensus would be the most difficult task. 29 years later, the predictions have proven accurate. The difficulties may be better identified, and the solutions better known, but the problem of state consent remains insurmountable.
The fight against space debris could involve creating a financial fund to combat debris (18). The models of ICAO or ITU are also inspiring (19), but the difficulty remains the same. The necessary legal instruments to combat debris are not found in the will of states nor in space law (20).
On one hand, engineers have largely resolved the debris issue by formulating standards like those of the IADC. On the other hand, legal experts have not yet been able to apply them due to a lack of a broad international consensus. While the solution has never been so close technically and legally, it has never been so far diplomatically, given the deteriorating international situation.
Two solutions are conceivable:
An optimistic approach could involve linking Canada’s initiative, along with Germany and the Czech Republic at COPUOS (21), to engage states in a building block or snowball effect dynamic, mainly (22) found in international environmental law (23). The idea would be to create a coalition of pioneering states affirming the binding nature of the rules contained in the technical standards to gradually make them binding on the rest of the international community. This scenario is appealing but cannot be studied due to a lack of available data. It could be an effective solution for regulating space debris through a minilateral strategy (24).
A more realistic approach could be through international custom. It has the advantage of being a spontaneous (25) and binding multilateral instrument. It does not suffer from multilateral blockages and develops through state practice, which is one of the strengths of anti-debris norms.
The approach will be to consider that technical standards, national legislation, and sometimes certain international rules are the formalization of a single set of rules. The similarity of content and the systematic references made between the technical standards and national legislation argue for a unified approach to the content of these norms, formalized in numerous legal mechanisms. Therefore, it will be necessary to analyze how anti-debris norms, taken as a whole, could have customary value.
State practice is reflected in national legislation. The space sector is unique in being more practiced legally than technically. It is easier to create a legal precedent by adopting a law than by completing a space mission. The topic of space resource appropriation is a sad example. States without industrial space capacity are getting involved through their national legislation in the debate on space resource appropriation solely for economic attractiveness purposes. Frans Von der Dunk refers to this culture of legal precedent created by these states as «paper practice» (26). This expression is meaningful since legislation, more than practice (often reserved for a minority of states), has become one of the main sources of space law.
These «paper practices,» while certainly criticizable, also have the advantage of opening the customary process to all states, including those without the capability to conduct their space activities. This technical barrier to the legal debate could be insurmountable for many states that do not yet have space technologies. Thus, the pitfalls of a law written only by northern states, which led to critical declarations such as Bogota’s (27), are avoided. The customary process around space debris seems spared from these general criticisms of international law (28). It is defended by countries from both the South and the North. A country like Cuba, very active in defending the interests of the South, stated in its position at COPUOS, “Cuba no posee naves ni vehículos espaciales y por ende no tiene desechos espaciales, pero por principio, estamos a favor de reducir los desechos espaciales en beneficio de toda la humanidad” (29). It thus seems possible to affirm that this customary pressure is shared by both Northern and Southern countries, making it representative of the entire international community.
With these methodological precautions taken, it is possible to frame the analysis of whether these anti-debris norms are customary. The International Law Commission’s project on «the determination of customary international law» (30) will provide a reference framework that will structure the discussion.
The second conclusion of the Commission provides the two constitutive elements to identify an international custom. For it, to «determine the existence and content of a rule of customary international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice that is accepted as law opinio juris».

Identification of Anti-Debris Norms

The first step in the demonstration is defining the term «anti-debris norms.» This part will focus on defining the content of this set of norms. The approach is to analyze technical standards, national legislation, and international responsibility law as a whole, which would constitute the corpus of anti-debris norms.
The technical anti-debris standards are numerous and are merely formalizations of a single norm. There is a formal plurality of anti-debris norms that disguises their material unity.
Technical standards specifying best practices for combating space debris are legion (31). Listing them all would be nearly impossible.
In addition to this list of technical standards, there are national technical regulations found in national laws and international law.

Unity of Anti-Debris Norms

These norms express the same content within a coherent normative order. All norms function together without contradiction.

Unity of Technical Anti-Debris Norms

While the content of anti-debris norms may vary from one norm to another, the core and solutions provided are the same.

Material Unity of Anti-Debris Norms

The anti-debris norms all originate from the IADC standards formalized in 2002 (32) and updated in 2020. The content of this norm has subsequently been adopted by all other technical anti-debris norms, such as those of the UN adopted by the resolution «on International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space» of 2007 (33) . The industry reference norm is ISO 24113:2023 (34). Other notable examples include the COPUOS (35) technical norm of ESA (36), the ITU-R (37) norm, and even NASA’s norm (38).
All these norms essentially convey the same message. Without engaging in a systemic analysis of these norms, it is noteworthy that they all refer to the passivation of a satellite at the end of its life (39). Ultimately, these norms convey the same principles (40).
However, there are particularities that correspond to local needs without questioning interoperability with other technical standards. For example, the ECSS-U-AS-10C rev.1 norm (41) presents itself as the European adaptation of the ISO 24113 (42) standard on space sustainability. NASA’s technical norm (43) addresses energy use in orbit differently from the ISO 24113 standard. Ultimately, these norms are merely local variations of a single rule.

Formal Unity of Anti-Debris Norms

Anti-debris norms work together, both among technical standards and with national and international norms.
Through a mechanism that could be called «relevance» (44), norms cite each other.
Technical norms all cite each other. The ECSS norm qualifies itself as a European adaptation of the ISO 24113 standard. The ISO 24113 standard extensively cites the IADC and COPUOS. One could endlessly pull this thread.
International organizations participate in this normative web. The ITU-R, with its standard (45) dedicated to geostationary orbits, and the United Nations General Assembly, by adopting COPUOS’s work, cite and are cited by all other technical norms. Their attachment, at least symbolically, to the international legal order does not impede their participation in this technical edifice.
National legislation also incorporates this content. Article 7 of the Portuguese Law on Space Operations (46) requires space operators to comply with anti-debris norms to obtain a license. The French law on space operations (47) also relies on technical regulations (48) that incorporate the principles of space debris mitigation. This general trend of national legislation emerges from the 2023 COPUOS report on instruments against space debris (49).
There is a plurality of anti-debris norms but a material unity. They express the same concepts.

The Relation of Anti-Debris Norms in International Law

These anti-debris norms integrate into international law. They specify the content of environmental and space law.
The connection between space debris mitigation and environmental damage law has already been studied in the doctrine (50).
The basis of this law dates back to the 1941 «Trail Smelter» arbitration award, where judges stated, «that under the principles of international law as well as of the law of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence» (51). The award prohibits states from allowing their territory to be used for purposes that could cause damage to the territory of another state. (1) Transboundary damage is thus sanctioned, and one can infer that (2) states must ensure that their territory does not cause damage. These principles of transboundary environmental damage prevention were confirmed in the «Lac Lanoux» (52) case and clarified by the second principle of the Rio Declaration (53). The principle was reiterated and reformulated to be enshrined by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons as part of customary norms. Thus, for the Court, states have the general obligation «to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control respect the environment of other states or areas beyond national jurisdiction as part of the body of rules of international environmental law» (54). The notion of damage was further clarified in a 2018 case where the Court specified «that damage to the environment as well as the degradation or loss of its capacity to provide goods and services are subject to compensation under international law» (55).
For international environmental law, there is therefore an obligation for the state — a responsibility it is free to implement — to ensure that its territory does not cause damage or degradation to the territory of another state or the environment. Otherwise, the state would be responsible for this damage.
This first conclusion of environmental law aligns with the position of space law, which has the additional advantage of avoiding the doctrinal question of general and special public international law.
Article 44 of the ITU Constitution states that «Member States shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and the geostationary-satellite orbits are limited natural resources that must be used rationally, efficiently, and economically, in accordance with the provisions of the Radio Regulations» (56). Orbits—and perhaps not only geostationary ones—can thus be viewed as an environment protected by environmental law. Moreover, the ITU-R’s technical standards related to debris mitigation (57) demonstrate the compatibility of anti-debris norms with this position in international law. A piece of debris can degrade the space environment. It can make satellite use more uncertain and disrupt the transmission of radio signals often necessary for state sovereignty, which seems to fit within the definition of the Costa Rica/Nicaragua case.
Anti-debris norms, therefore, seem to be linked to international law. But their application will depend on the actors involved, as noted by public international law concerning the environment and space.
According to these rules, the state benefits from an exemption. Article I of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty clearly states: «Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law» (58). States are free to use space in accordance with international law. Article VI of the same treaty makes states responsible for their nationals’ activities in space, which they must actively supervise (59). The state is only responsible in the event of damage, meaning that before the damage occurs, the state is free to take risks that it can evaluate independently. It has the right to be irresponsible until damage occurs.
Therefore, the norms of combating space debris do not seem applicable to states. This is also what environmental law indicates. The state freely disposes of its territory. It has the sole obligation to compensate for damages it causes to other states or international spaces.
The only obligation that seems to rest on the state is the obligation to monitor its national operators just as it is responsible for activities conducted within its territory. The ICJ’s advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons states that the state has the obligation «to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control respect the environment of other states or areas beyond national jurisdiction,» which perfectly aligns with the Article VI of the 1967 Treaty. The state is free to take risks; it is sovereign, but it must ensure that its nationals do not damage the environment. Thus, anti-debris norms are not enforceable against the state—and they say nothing different—but states are obliged to enforce them on their national operators.

A Proposal for Formalizing Anti-Debris Norms

Having made these remarks, it is possible to propose what could be the content of anti-debris norms. They are the synthesis of technical norms, national legislation, and international law. They are merely a proposal offered for debate and critique.
Customary anti-debris norms could be formulated as follows:
1) The development of a plan for minimizing debris in mission conduct.
2) The prohibition of the operational release of debris in orbit unless they do not represent an operational debris threat in the short and medium term.
3) The design of space objects to minimize the spread of space debris.
4) The passivation of satellites at the end of their mission.
5) The prohibition of the deliberate destruction (in the sense of fragmentation) of a satellite.
6) End-of-Mission Satellite Management:
a) On a geostationary orbit, it must move away from the Earth and reach a so-called «graveyard» orbit.
b) On a low Earth orbit, it must deorbit and reach the atmosphere within 25 years.
c) On another orbit, therefore, medium, it must either reach a «graveyard» orbit or reach the atmosphere.
7) The trajectory of a satellite must be as unobtrusive as possible in orbit management.
8) The state is responsible for continuous monitoring of compliance with these norms.
9) The sovereign activities of states are excluded from these rules. They fall under their international responsibility (60).

The Presence of General Practice in Anti-Debris Norms

Having established the anti-debris norms, the next step is to analyze their customary value.

Practices to Consider

The first point to address when determining the customary nature of anti-debris norms is identifying the presence of practice according to Conclusion 2 of the International Law Commission’s project on the identification of customary international law (61).
Conclusion 4 provides the definition of practice as follows:
“Conclusion 4: Requirement of Practice

  1. The requirement of general practice as a constituent element of customary international law means that it is primarily the practice of states that contributes to the formation or expression of rules of customary international law.
  2. In some cases, the practice of international organizations also contributes to the formation or expression of rules of customary international law.
  3. The conduct of other actors does not constitute practice that can contribute to the formation or expression of rules of customary international law, but it may be relevant for assessing the practice referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2» (62).
    This will serve as the framework for our analysis. Therefore, the practices of states and international organizations will be considered.
    The commentary by the Commission indicates that «State practice consists of its behavior in exercising its executive, legislative, judicial, or other functions» (63). Everything can potentially be considered international practice. The space sector is unique in that it is more legally practiced than it is in reality. This erases the technical barrier of space to the customary writing of law but also tends to separate the law from technical reality (64). Therefore, the actions of states and international organizations should be considered.
    In the context of anti-debris norms, the inevitable question arises regarding the consideration of technical norms as international practice. Conclusion 6 of the International Law Commission demonstrates considerable flexibility regarding the criteria for admissibility. Thus, it states:
  4. Practice may take a wide variety of forms. It includes both physical and verbal acts. It may, in certain circumstances, include inaction.
  5. Forms of state practice include, but are not limited to: diplomatic acts and correspondence; conduct related to resolutions adopted by an international organization or at an intergovernmental conference; conduct concerning treaties; executive conduct, including operational conduct «on the ground»; legislative and administrative acts; and decisions of domestic courts» (65).
    The question of whether creating a precedent can depend on the nature of this practice.
    The mechanism of incorporating technical norms resolves the situations as a whole. It means that the content of a technical norm is adopted or cited by a legally binding text to integrate it into its legal order. This hypothesis poses few difficulties because it is about the question of constituting a precedent by adopting a national norm. This question is explicitly addressed by the International Law Commission in its Conclusion 6.
    International unilateral acts illustrate this mechanism. If the state recognizes a technical norm as binding through a declaration or treaty, it becomes enforceable. This is the sense of the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice known as the «Nuclear Tests» (66) case, which was applied in the «Pulp Mills» case (67). In the case, Uruguay incorporated technical norms into its international obligations in a treaty with Argentina. The Court considered the technical norms binding (68).
    The analogy could be transposable for the technical norms of the IADC or another standardization body formalizing the norms technically.
    In these circumstances, it seems possible to avoid the question of the legal nature of technical norms by focusing on the behavior of states or even international organizations, which has been studied by international law. It allows characterizing unilateral acts or conventional obligations that fulfill the conditions of customary precedent.

Nature of Practice

The nature of practice will be analyzed according to the criteria of the Commission in its Conclusion 8, which states that «The relevant practice must be general, that is, sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent» (69).

Spread of Practice

The practice of anti-debris norms is widespread at the international level. The United Nations General Assembly resolution of 2007 (70), which approved the COPUOS guidelines on debris mitigation, was adopted by 127 states (71). The American bloc’s vote against was due to the United States’ opposition to the financial aspect of the UN-SPIDER program. To these 129 states, we must add the adherence of the 83 states in the 2023 COPUOS (72) report on anti-debris legislation, which confirms the American bloc’s adherence to orbital debris mitigation norms. Furthermore, there are almost annual references by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution on the peaceful uses of space to space debris, adopted by large majorities. Thus, these norms seem extremely widespread.

Representativeness of Practice

Conversely, the 2023 COPUOS report (73) indicates that at least 15 states (74)—although there are more—have legislation incorporating anti-debris norms. These states may appear to be a minority, but they cover almost all space activities. Indeed, only a handful of states can conduct space activities, and even fewer have launch facilities. Therefore, almost all states that can be legally responsible for debris have adapted legislation.
These laws have significant extraterritorial effects. Launch sites are legislative nodes. Anyone wishing to launch a satellite must do so from a launch site and therefore respect the law of the launch state. Thus, even if these laws are not widely adopted formally, they materially cover the entire space sector.
French law illustrates the extraterritorial nature of launch operation law. Article 4 of the French law (75) subjects the transfer of satellite control to administrative authorization (76). This transfer operation, for example, will be conditioned on compliance with CNES’s technical regulations (77), which themselves incorporate anti-debris norms.
Thus, if we count the launches conducted in 2023, we observe that 92,8% (78) of satellite launches were conducted in compliance with anti-debris norms.

A potential objection could be raised regarding the under-representation of countries in the Global South. However, the 2023 COPUOS report and the votes on the United Nations General Assembly resolutions dispel this concern.

Uniformity of Practice

The technical practice of technical norms is uniform. This is the essence of technical standardization. It aims to standardize technology by certifying or even mandating certain behaviors (79).
This is reflected in the ISO 24113 standard. It opens the door to technical certification. Compliance with it can be a competitive advantage in the market and technically by ensuring interoperability with other operators. The standard exerts pressure towards uniformity.
More importantly, it is the role of international organizations that is crucial to the uniformity of practice. The ITU (80) and COPUOS (81) have adopted debris mitigation standards based on IADC’s work. They politically support anti-debris norms and contribute to their dissemination. For example, the ITU has adopted recommendation S.1003-2 through its radiocommunications branch. It is responsible for frequency management and can issue internationally binding texts, unlike its «T» branch entirely dedicated to technical standardization without legal authority. By adopting recommendation S.1003-2 through its radiocommunications branch, the ITU politically supports the dissemination of this version of the standard.
Thus, there seems to be a uniform practice of anti-debris norms.

Temporal Inscription of Practice

The temporal inscription of practices is the last condition to characterize a practice (82).
Without a precise timeframe for a norm to become customary, the Court indicates «that a brief lapse of time does not necessarily constitute a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law» (83) without allowing for the emergence of instantaneous custom, contrary to the thesis defended by Bin Cheng (84).
In the absence of this timeframe, we can only trace a genealogy of these anti-debris practices.
The first norms were adopted following the work of the IADC in 2002. Compared to 2024, this means that the established practice is at least 22 years old. Compared to other international rights like the law of the sea, this period may seem extremely short, but relative to space history, this duration seems more established.
Indeed, if we refer to the beginning of space activities, which can be marked by the launch of Sputnik in 1957, space history would be 67 years old. The 22 years of anti-debris norms would represent only 1/3 of space history.
A second marker is possible. It could be the awareness by humanity of the debris problem. The publication in 1978 of Donald Kessler and Burton Cour-Palais (85) article would mark the beginning of a practice suggesting that by this date—this would need to be proven—anti-debris norms would have begun to be applied. In this hypothesis, anti-debris norms would have been applied for 46 years, or 2/3 of space history since Sputnik.
Without being able or wanting to decide this question, it seems justified to think that practice seems to be inscribed in a temporality that time will likely not disavow.
Thus, practice seems to have the attributes of a general practice.

The Difficult Identification of Opinio Juris in Anti-Debris Norms

The elements suggesting the existence of an established general practice having been examined, it is now necessary to analyze the second condition for identifying a customary norm, namely opinio juris.
The first step is to differentiate the behavior of states from «simple usage or habit» and ensure «that the general practice is accepted as law,» using the formulations of Conclusion 9 concerning opinio juris by the International Law Commission (86).
The second point is that states’ legal policy (87) is ambiguous. There is an international position, but several interpretations of their international positions are possible. Do states (1) refer to anti-debris norms as a whole? which would block any customary crystallization, or (2) do they assert that these norms do not apply to them?
The question remains open in terms of opinio juris and could be a significant obstacle in identifying custom.

Possible Assimilation of Anti-Debris Norms to «Usage or Simple Habit

Conclusion 9 and its commentary exclude elements characterizing opinio juris from simple usage or habit. This exclusion seems to capture the general practice of anti-debris norms.
Commentary 3 of Conclusion 9 by the Commission states that «acceptance as law must be distinguished from other motives for action, such as courtesy, political convenience, or expediency». The Commission, citing the «North Sea Continental Shelf» (88) judgment, uses the example of rolling out the red carpet in diplomatic affairs. This is done for protocol reasons but not out of legal obligation. Technical norms could follow this logic. Technical norms are primarily respected for economic and technical reasons, not due to a legal obligation. All norms, until their hypothetical incorporation into a legally binding norm, are incentive mechanisms. This is the case with ISO 24113, ECSS standards, ITU standards, or even COPUOS.
The argument supporting the attachment of anti-debris norms to usage and habits relates to sources.
The conventional relationship between domestic law and public international law is a downward relationship. The obligation comes from international law and is recognized in international obligations in acknowledgment of customary norms. It is a deliberate act operating on a pure legal logic based on formal criteria. For technical norms, the approach is the opposite. It is an upward logic that pushes for the adoption of a law based on its material utility. The content of the norm is juridicized because it is the most relevant content to address a technical issue that has become legal. Some speak of a spontaneous logic. In this regard, for these spontaneous sources (89), as seen in French administrative law with the Numericable (90) jurisprudence and European law with the James Elliott (91) case, the effectiveness of the norm is the determining criterion for its legality. Harmonized norms were considered as «part of the legal order of the Union» (92) because they reached a level of constraint requiring judges to consider them. This approach, based on the intensity of the binding nature, differs from the customary approach. It analyzes the obligation by its nature and not its effectiveness. It will therefore involve analyzing the legal compliance between norms of the same customary nature. Technical norms are incorporated for utilitarian, not procedural reasons, which seems to assimilate them more to a usage or habit—even if these expressions may not be appropriate—than to a practice of customary opinio juris.

The Rejection of Opinio Juris by States

The most significant difficulty in recognizing the customary nature of anti-debris norms is the opinio juris of states. Their international positions are clear: states do not want anti-debris norms to be enforceable against them. It is likely that if states’ positions do not evolve, anti-debris norms will never become customary if that is their destiny.
Thus, the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 62/217, in paragraph 27, affirms that these guidelines have «a voluntary nature» (93). The position remained the same in 2023, where the Assembly noted «with satisfaction that some Member States are already voluntarily implementing measures to reduce space debris» (94).
More generally, states at the international level often pass non-binding declarations like those of the G7 (95), the European Space Agency (96), or Asiatic (97).

Interpreting the Rejection of Opinio Juris by States

At this point, the issue could be resolved: anti-debris norms are not recognized as part of customary law. States assert that they are not applicable to them.
However, this position is ambiguous. Are anti-debris norms not applicable to all space activities or only to state activities?
In the first case, the answer remains clear: anti-debris norms are not customary.
But in the second hypothesis, the answer would be more complex and would leave room for the customary recognition of anti-debris norms. Indeed, if states assert that anti-debris norms do not apply to their (sovereign) activities, then the door remains open for these norms to apply to national operators through the obligation of supervision under Article VI of the 1967 Treaty
The arguments supporting this hypothesis are that it corresponds to the practice of states and space operators and aligns with public international law.
States have carved out an exception for themselves in space law, consistent with other international rights. For example, state aircraft are excluded from the Chicago Convention (98), and warships have a special status in the Montego Bay Convention (99). In space law, states are free to take sovereign risks within treaty limits. They are responsible only after damage occurs. This is reflected in Chapter V of the French Law on Space Operations, which exempts CNES operations and those «l’État dans l’intérêt de la défense nationale» (100) from the general regime of space operations. The sovereign is free to conduct the space activities they wish in space, implying they can be freely irresponsible for their behavior until damage occurs.
This state of public international law aligns with states’ positions. They consistently emphasize that anti-debris norms are not applicable to them. But as we have seen, anti-debris norms do not apply to states but to national operators.
The only obligation states have is to monitor their national operators’ activities according to Article VI of the 1967 Treaty. This obligation aligns with international environmental damage law, which states that «activities conducted within their jurisdiction or under their control respect the environment in other states or areas beyond national jurisdiction» (101) as part of international environmental law. On this point, states are particularly vigilant as it concerns their international responsibility. National space operation laws establish controls that align with the anti-debris norms defined previously (102).

Conclusions

At the end of these developments, it is clear that today the technical anti-debris norms, used by the majority of the space sector, cannot yet be considered customary norms given the international positions of states. They succeed through their international positions in defusing any recognition of opinio juris.
A positive outcome is not entirely out of the question. Firstly, the initiative by Germany, Canada, and the Czech Republic to compile national anti-debris legislation could be seen as the beginning of some states asserting an opinio juris, which could, through a snowball effect, bind the rest of the international community. Furthermore, the assertion of Southern countries in space law is an important signal. They seem more favorable to the environmental protection of orbits. They too could initiate a snowball effect. Finally, it is observed that the opposition of Northern countries is no longer as categorical regarding anti-debris norms. While they were «voluntary,» they now participate in a «process» that could eventually become binding.
All these elements, coupled with social pressure that will only increase due to the Kessler and Cour-Palais syndrome, leave room for hope of a customary transformation of anti-debris norms.
The ultimate question is the utility of this conclusion. Is it significant? Yes, it is useful—or at least it attempts to be—in the field of public international law. But it must be acknowledged that the common law of space activities is no longer public international space law but the law of space activities. It operates as a regime addressing the entire space sector (103). The state is just one actor among others. It even aligns itself with the regime logic in defense matters (104). The state in space is itself increasingly less regulated by public international law. Therefore, striving to use instruments of public international law remains essential, but it would only address the iceberg’s visible part. The submerged part already accommodates anti-debris norms with which it evolves. The desire of states to rise above common law in the name of their sovereignty is an authority argument that stops jurists. But an accident will inevitably come. It will require states to refer to an existing positive law that is used in all other space activities except their own.

References

  1. It is necessary to warmly thank Ms. Salomé Paradis for her advice and careful proofreading.
  2. D.J. KESSLER et B.G. COUR-PALAIS, « Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a debris belt », Journal of geophysical research, juin 1978, vol. 83, n° A6, disponible sur http://www.castor2.ca/07_News/headline_010216_files/Kessler_Collision_Frequency_1978.pdf.
  3. C. BONNAL, Pollution spatiale: L’état d’urgence, Paris, BELIN, 5 août 2016.
  4. P.B. LARSEN, « Solving the Space Debris Crisis », Journal of Air Law and Commerce, 2018, vol. 83, n° 3, p. 485.
    5.. Ibid., p. 497.
    6.. See, for example, the latest version of the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Commitee, mars 2020, disponible sur httpsorbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.govlibraryiadc-space-debris-guidelines-revision-2.pdf.
  5. See also: « Recommandation S.1003-2 : Protection de l’environnement de l’orbite des satellites géostationnaires », 17 décembre 2012, disponible sur https://www.itu.int/rec/R-REC-S.1003/fr (Consulté le 13 juin 2024) ; « ECSS-U-AS-10C Rev.1 – Adoption Notice of ISO 24113: Space systems – Space debris mitigation requirements (3 December 2019) | European Cooperation for Space Standardization », 3 décembre 2019, disponible sur https://ecss.nl/standard/ecss-u-as-10c-adoption-notice-of-iso-24113-space-systems-space-debris-mitigation-requirements-2/ (Consulté le 18 juin 2024) ; « ISO 24113:2023 Systèmes spatiaux Exigences de mitigation des débris spatiaux », mars 2023, disponible sur https://www.iso.org/fr/standard/83494.html (Consulté le 26 janvier 2024) ; « NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris», 18 avril 2024, disponible sur https://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayDir.cfm?t=NPR&c=8715&s=6B.
  6. « Arrêté du 31 mars 2011 relatif à la réglementation technique en application du décret n° 2009-643 du 9 juin 2009 relatif aux autorisations délivrées en application de la loi n° 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales – Légifrance », s.d., disponible sur https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000024095828/ (Consulté le 19 octobre 2023).
  7. Résolution relative à la Coopération internationale touchant les utilisations pacifiques de l’espace, A/RES/62/217, 22 décembre 2007, disponible sur httpsdocuments-dds-ny.un.orgdocUNDOCGENN0747680PDFN0747680.pdfOpenElement.pdf.
  8. Space debris mitigation standards adopted by states and international organizations, Comité des utilisations pacifiques de l’espace extra-atmosphérique, 1 mars 2023, disponible sur https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/Space_Debris_Compendium_COPUOS_20_March_2023.pdf (Consulté le 30 octobre 2023).
  9. The positions of Brazil and Cuba were considered to be in favour of anti-debris standards given their international behaviour and the nature of their response. In reality, the response is more complex. The list of countries is: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Philippines, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.
  10. Résolution relative à la Coopération internationale touchant les utilisations pacifiques de l’espace, A/RES/78/72, 7 décembre 2023, § 16, disponible sur https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/resolutions/2023/general_assembly_78th_session/ares7872_html/N2339758.pdf (Consulté le 10 juin 2024).
  11. Loi relative aux opérations spatiales, 2008‑518, JORF n°0129 du 4 juin 2008, 3 juin 2008, art. 5, disponible sur https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000018931380/ (Consulté le 6 novembre 2022) ; Arrêté modifiant l’arrêté du 31 mars 2011 relatif à la réglementation technique en application du décret n° 2009-643 du 9 juin 2009 relatif aux autorisations délivrées en application de la loi n° 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales, art. 21, 40, disponible sur https://technical-regulation-information-system.ec.europa.eu/fr/notification/25145 ; Pour un commentaire voir par exemple L. RAPP, « Une loi spatiale française », Actualité juridique du droit administratif, 2008, vol. 2008, p. 1755.
  12. D.P. WOOD, « Who Should Regulate the Space Environment: The Laissez-Faire, National, and Multinational Options », Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995, vol. 48, n° 6, pp. 12‑34, disponible sur https://www.jstor.org/stable/3824203 (Consulté le 13 juin 2024).
  13. Ibid., p. 13.
  14. Ibid., p. 19.
  15. Ibid., p. 24.
  16. E. KISIEL, « Law as an Instrument to Solve the Orbital Debris Problem », Environmental Law, 2021, vol. 51, n° 1, p. 233, disponible sur https://www.jstor.org/stable/27027138 (Consulté le 13 juin 2024) ; A. SHEER et al., « A panacea to address the legal, administrative and economic aspects of space debris », Advances in Space Research, octobre 2023, vol. 72, n° 7, p. 2622, disponible sur https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0273117723001424 (Consulté le 17 avril 2024).
  17. G. HASIN, « Confronting space debris through the regime evolution approach », International Law Studies, 2021, vol. 97, § 1119 ; P.B. LARSEN, « Solving the Space Debris Crisis », op. cit., pp. 503‑508.
  18. A. FERREIRA-SNYMAN, « The environmental responsibility of states for space debris and the implications for developing countries in Africa », The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, 2013, vol. 46, n° 1, pp. 19‑51, disponible sur https://www.jstor.org/stable/23644687 (Consulté le 13 juin 2024).
  19. Space debris mitigation standards adopted by states and international organizations, op. cit.
  20. A. CHAZELLE, « Le minilatéralisme un second souffle pour le multilatéralisme dans la régulation économique ? », Demi-journées d’étude du Réseau des Jeunes Chercheurs, La régulation économique, entre bilatéralisme et multilatéralisme, Université Versailles-Saint-Quentin, 8 avril 2022, disponible sur https://www.sfdi.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Alexandre-Chazelle-Le-minilateralisme-un-second-souffle-pour-le-multilateralisme-dans-la-regulation-economique.pdf.
  21. D. WILLIAMS et R. CANTRELL, « Rethinking the kyoto protocol: are there legal solutions to global warming and climate change? », Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2006, vol. 5, n° 2, pp. 333‑380 ; R. FALKNER, H. STEPHAN et J. VOGLER, « International Climate Policy after Copenhagen: Towards a ‘Building Blocks’ Approach: International Climate Policy », Global Policy, octobre 2010, vol. 1, n° 3, pp. 252‑262, disponible sur https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00045.x (Consulté le 29 juillet 2023).
  22. N. MOISÉS, « Minilateralism », Foreign Policy, 2009, n° 173, pp. 135‑136, disponible sur https://www.jstor.org/stable/20684900 ; C. BRANDI, A. BERGER et D. BRUHN, « Between Minilateralism and Multilateralism: Opportunities and Risks of Pioneer Alliances in International Trade and Climate Politics », German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Briefing Paper, 2015, vol. 2015, n° 16, p. 5, disponible sur https://www.researchgate.net/publication/295702315_Between_minilateralism_and_multilateralism_opportunities_and_risks_of_pioneer_alliances_in_international_trade_and_climate_politics?enrichId=rgreq-f27e287fa3d30f4fa915741bf03ea986-XXX&enrichSource=Y292ZXJQYWdlOzI5NTcwMjMxNTtBUzozMzIzMzczNjg4NDYzMzZAMTQ1NjI0NjgxMTQ5Mg%3D%3D&el=1_x_3&_esc=publicationCoverPdf ; A. ANUAR et N. HUSSAIN, Minilateralism for multilateralism in the post-covid age, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, janvier 2021, p. 15, disponible sur https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/PR210119_Minilateralism-For-Multilateralism-in-the-Post-COVID-Age.pdf.
  23. A. HERMET, « Le concept de droit spontané dans la pensée de Roberto Ago», in INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES (éd.), Grandes pages du droit international – les sources, 2, Paris, Éditions A. Pedone, 2016, pp. 203‑232.
  24. F.G. VON DER DUNK, « Customary International Law and Outer Space », in B.D. LEPARD (éd.), Reexamining Customary International Law, 1re éd., s.l., Cambridge University Press, 16 février 2017, p. 355, disponible sur https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781316544624%23CN-bp-11/type/book_part (Consulté le 20 août 2022).
  25. Déclaration de Bogota, 3 décembre 1976, disponible sur http://www.root.ps/download/ASM/dec_bogota.pdf.
  26. B.S. CHIMNI, « Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective », The American Journal of International Law, 2018, vol. 112, n° 1, pp. 1‑46, disponible sur https://www.jstor.org/stable/26568923 (Consulté le 13 juin 2024).
  27. Space debris mitigation standards adopted by states and international organizations, op. cit., p. 25.
  28. COMMISSION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Projets de conclusion sur la détermination du droit international coutumier et commentaires y relatifs, Annuaire de la commission du droit international 2018, vol. II(2), Commission du droit international, 2018, disponible sur https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/1_13.shtml.
  29. A. CHAZELLE, Normes et normalisation technique dans les systèmes satellitaires, op. cit.
  30. Guidelines IADC, op. cit.
  31. résolution 62/217, op. cit.
  32. « ISO 24113 », op. cit.
  33. COMITE DES UTILISATIONS PACIFIQUES DE L’ESPACE EXTRA-ATMOSPHERIQUE, « Lignes directrices relatives à la réduction des débris spatiaux », s.d., disponible sur https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/COPUOS-GuidelinesF.pdf (Consulté le 13 juin 2024).
  34. « ECSS-U-AS-10C », op. cit.
  35. « Recommandation S.1003-2 : Protection de l’environnement de l’orbite des satellites géostationnaires », op. cit.
  36. « NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris », op. cit.
  37. Guidelines IADC, op. cit., sect. 5.2 ; résolution 62/217, op. cit., sect. Annexe 4.2 ; « ISO 24113 », op. cit., art. 6.3.3 ; Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 2010, art. D1, disponible sur https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf ; « NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris », op. cit., sect. 4.6.2.
  38. The unified content of these standards is given on page 13.
  39. « ECSS-U-AS-10C », op. cit.
  40. « ISO 24113 », op. cit.
  41. « NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris », op. cit.
  42. S. ROMANO, L’ordre juridique, 1918.
  43. « Recommandation S.1003-2 : Protection de l’environnement de l’orbite des satellites géostationnaires », op. cit.
  44. Loi Portugaise sur les activités spatiales, Decreto-Lei n°. 16/2019, 22 janvier 2019, art. 7c), disponible sur https://ptspace.pt/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/lei-do-espaco.pdf (Consulté le 30 novembre 2023) ; M. COCCO et H.C. MENDONÇA, « The Portuguese Space Act: An Innovative Framework for Space Activities », Air and Space Law, 2020, vol. 45, n° 2, pp. 157‑199.
  45. L. RAPP, « Une loi spatiale française », op. cit. ; Loi relative aux opérations spatiales, op. cit.
  46. « Arrêté du 31 mars 2011 relatif à la réglementation technique en application du décret n° 2009-643 du 9 juin 2009 relatif aux autorisations délivrées en application de la loi n° 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales – Légifrance », op. cit.
  47. Space debris mitigation standards adopted by states and international organizations, op. cit.
  48. P.B. LARSEN, « Solving the Space Debris Crisis », op. cit., p. 490 ; P. STUBBE, State Accountability for Space Debris – A Legal Study of Responsibility for Polluting the Space Environment and Liability for Damage Caused by Space Debris, 12, Studies in Space Law, s.l., Brill | Nijhoff, 13 novembre 2017, pp. 168 et S., disponible sur https://brill.com/display/title/32925 (Consulté le 13 juin 2024).
  49. Trail smelter case (United States, Canada), 11 mars 1941, Recueil des sentences arbitrales, III, p. 1965, disponible sur https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf (Consulté le 8 juillet 2024).
  50. Affaire du lac Lanoux (Espagne, France), 16 novembre 1957, Recueil des sentences arbitral, XII, pp. 281‑317, disponible sur https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XII/281-317_Lanoux.pdf ; A. GERVAIS, « L’affaire du lac Lanoux, étude critique de la sentence arbitrale du Tribunal arbitral », Annuaire Français de Droit International, 1960, vol. 6, n° 1, pp. 372‑434, disponible sur https://www.persee.fr/doc/afdi_0066-3085_1960_num_6_1_911 (Consulté le 2 août 2024).
  51. Déclaration de Rio sur l’environnement et le développement, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), 14 juin 1992, disponible sur https://www.un.org/french/events/rio92/aconf15126vol1f.htm Principe 2.
  52. Cour internationale de justice, Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucléaires, 8 juillet 1996, 95, Recueil des arrêts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances, 1996, § 29, disponible sur https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-FR.pdf (Consulté le 18 décembre 2022) ; « 32 – Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucléaires », in Les grandes décisions de la jurisprudence internationale, 1er éd., Grands arrêts, Paris, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 416‑440.
  53. Cour internationale de Justice, Certaines activités menées par le Nicaragua dans la région frontalière – (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua) – Indemnisation due par la République du Nicaragua à la République du Costa Rica, 2 février 2018, 150, Recueil des Arrêts, Avis consultatifs et Ordonnances, 2018, § 42, disponible sur https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/150/150-20180202-JUD-01-00-FR.pdf (Consulté le 7 juillet 2024).
  54. Constitution de l’Union Internationale des Télécommunications, 22 décembre 1992, art. 44, disponible sur https://www.itu.int/en/council/Documents/basic-texts/Constitution-F.pdf.
  55. « Recommandation S.1003-2 : Protection de l’environnement de l’orbite des satellites géostationnaires », op. cit.
  56. Traité sur les principes régissant les activités des États en matière d’exploration et d’utilisation de l’espace extra- atmosphérique, y compris la Lune et les autres corps célestes, 2222, 10 octobre 1967, art. I, disponible sur https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11F.pdf.
  57. Ibid., art. VII ; Convention sur la responsabilité internationale pour les dommages causés par les objets spatiaux, Recueil des traités ONU Vol. 961,1-13810, 29 mars 1972, disponible sur https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20961/volume-961-I-13810-French.pdf.
  58. This point is certainly the most debatable. It comes to conclude that anti-debris norms apply differently to states and space operators. The thesis being defended is that states’ positions should be read from this perspective. When they declare that anti-debris norms are optional, as in the 2007 resolution, they imply that the norms are optional for their sovereign space activities. But at no time do states deny their obligation to monitor their national operators, which is incumbent upon them. The obligations of national operators include anti-debris norms. There would be a tendency to dissociate the obligations of operators from those of states. It is the strengthening of this dissociation that could give anti-debris norms customary value.
  59. COMMISSION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Projets de conclusion sur la détermination du droit international coutumier et commentaires y relatifs, op. cit., p. 4.
  60. COMMISSION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Projets de conclusion sur la détermination du droit international coutumier et commentaires y relatifs, op. cit., p. 9.
  61. Conclusion 5 ibid., p. 12.
  62. F.G. VON DER DUNK, « Customary International Law and Outer Space », op. cit.
  63. COMMISSION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Projets de conclusion sur la détermination du droit international coutumier et commentaires y relatifs, op. cit., p. 12.
  64. Cour Internationale de Justice, Affaire des essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), 20 décembre 1974, 59, Recueil des arrêts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances, 1974, p. 457, disponible sur https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/59/059-19741220-JUD-01-00-FR.pdf (Consulté le 23 mai 2023) ; « 23 – Essais nucléaires », in Les grandes décisions de la jurisprudence internationale, 1er éd., Grands arrêts, Paris, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 289‑306.
  65. Cour Internationale de Justice, Affaire relative à des usines de pâte à papier sur le fleuve Uruguay (Argentine c. Uruguay), 20 avril 2010, 135, Recueil des Arrêts, Avis consultatifs et Ordonnances, 2010, pp. 14‑97, disponible sur https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/135/135-20100420-JUD-01-00-FR.pdf.
  66. Ibid., §§ 193 et S.
  67. COMMISSION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Projets de conclusion sur la détermination du droit international coutumier et commentaires y relatifs, op. cit., p. 15 conclusion 8.
  68. résolution 62/217, op. cit., §§ 26 et 27.
  69. The countries for are : Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Finland, France, Russian Federation, Spain, United Arab Emirates, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, Morocco, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Panama, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Syrian Arab Republic, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Dominican Republic, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Czech Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Swaziland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. The countries against are : Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America. The countries abstaining are : Bosnia-Herzegovina, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Montenegro, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea.
  70. Space debris mitigation standards adopted by states and international organizations, op. cit.
  71. Ibid.
  72. These countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
  73. One example is the Lois françaises ou Australiennes ibid. ; Space Launches and Returns – General Rules, F2023C00798 (C01), 17 août 2023, disponible sur https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2019L01118/latest/text “(1) The strategy for debris mitigation in the application must be based on an internationally recognised guideline or standard for debris mitigation, and identify the guideline or standard being used. Note: Subsection 34(2) of the Act requires an application for the grant of an Australian launch permit to include a strategy for debris mitigation. (2) The strategy must describe any mitigation measures planned for orbital debris arising from the proposed launch or launches (including from payloads). Note: Examples of appropriate measures include measures to address the following: (a) how debris may be limited during normal operations; (b) how the potential for break-ups during operational phases will be minimised; (c) how the probability of accidental collision in orbit will be limited; (d) how the potential for post-mission break-ups as a result of stored energy will be minimised; (e) how the long-term presence of payloads and launch vehicle orbital stages in the low-earth orbit region or in geosynchronous earth orbit will be limited after the end of the mission”.
  74. Arrêté modifiant l’arrêté du 31 mars 2011 relatif à la réglementation technique en application du décret n° 2009-643 du 9 juin 2009 relatif aux autorisations délivrées en application de la loi n° 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales, op. cit.
  75. « Arrêté du 31 mars 2011 relatif à la réglementation technique en application du décret n° 2009-643 du 9 juin 2009 relatif aux autorisations délivrées en application de la loi n° 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales – Légifrance », op. cit.
  76. The figure is based on data available on Wikipédia and cross-checked against the COPUOS launch register.
  77. J. TIROLE, « Normes et propriété intelectuelle: la vue d’un économiste », La lettre de l’autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes, août 2006, n° 51, pp. 14‑16, disponible sur httpsarchives.arcep.fruploadstx_gspublicationlettre51.pdf.
  78. « Recommandation S.1003-2 : Protection de l’environnement de l’orbite des satellites géostationnaires », op. cit.
  79. « Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space », septembre 2022.
  80. COMMISSION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Projets de conclusion sur la détermination du droit international coutumier et commentaires y relatifs, op. cit., p. 15 Conclusion 8.
  81. Cour internationale de justice, Affaire du plateau continental de la mer du nord (République fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemarque; République fédérale d’Allemagne/ Pays-Bas), 20 février 1969, 51 & 52, Recueil des arrêts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances, 1999, p. 3, disponible sur https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/51/051-19690220-JUD-01-00-FR.pdf (Consulté le 22 août 2022) ; « 20 – Plateau continental de la mer du nord », in Les grandes décisions de la jurisprudence internationale, 1er éd., Grands arrêts, Paris, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 245‑273.
  82. B. CHENG, « United Nations resolution on outer space: “instant” international customary law ? », Indian journal of international law, 1965, vol. 5, pp. 23‑48 ; B. CHENG, Studies in International Space Law, s.l., Oxford University Press, 18 décembre 1997, disponible sur https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198257301.001.0001/acprof-9780198257301 (Consulté le 14 novembre 2021) ; COMMISSION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Projets de conclusion sur la détermination du droit international coutumier et commentaires y relatifs, op. cit., p. 17.
  83. D.J. KESSLER et B.G. COUR-PALAIS, « Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a debris belt », op. cit.
  84. COMMISSION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Projets de conclusion sur la détermination du droit international coutumier et commentaires y relatifs, op. cit., p. 18.
  85. G. DE LACHARRIERE, La politique juridique extérieure, Pratique(s) du droit international – Grands écrits, s.l., Bruylant, 5 janvier 2023.
  86. « 20 – Plateau continental de la mer du nord », op. cit., § 77.
  87. P. DEUMIER, Le droit spontané, 49, rue Héricart, 75015, Economica, 2002 ; B. OPPETIT, Droit et modernité, Doctrine juridique, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1998.
  88. Conseil d’État, Société Fairvesta International GMBH et autres; Société NC Numéricable, 21 mars 2016, 368082, Publié au recuil Lebon, disponible sur https://www.conseil-etat.fr/fr/arianeweb/CE/decision/2016-03-21/368082.
  89. Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, James Elliott Construction Limited v Irish Asphalt Limited, 27 octobre 2016, disponible sur https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0613&from=FR ; C. COLOMBO et M. ELIANTONIO, « Harmonized technical standards as part of EU law: Juridification with a number of unresolved legitimacy concerns?: Case C-613/14 James Elliot Construction Limited v. Irish Asphalt Limited, EU:C:2016:821 », Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, avril 2017, vol. 24, n° 2, pp. 323‑340, disponible sur https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263X17709753 (Consulté le 1 mars 2023) ; A. VAN WAEYENBERGE, « La normalisation technique en Europe. L’Empire (du droit) contre-attaque », Revue internationale de droit économique, 2018, n° 3, p. 305, disponible sur http://www.cairn.info/revue-internationale-de-droit-economique-2018-3-page-305.htm?ref=doi (Consulté le 13 juin 2022).
  90. Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, James Elliott Construction Limited v Irish Asphalt Limited, 27 octobre 2016, op. cit., § 34.
  91. résolution 62/217, op. cit.
  92. Résolution 78/72, op. cit., § 16.
  93. « Communiqué du sommet des dirigeants du G7 de Carbis Bay », 13 juin 2021, § 35, disponible sur https://www.pm.gc.ca/fr/nouvelles/notes-dinformation/2021/06/13/communique-du-sommet-des-dirigeants-du-g7-de-carbis-bay (Consulté le 13 juin 2024).
  94. Charte zéro débris, 16 octobre 2023, disponible sur https://esoc.esa.int/sites/default/files/Zero_Debris_Charter_EN.pdf (Consulté le 2 juillet 2024).
  95. Nagoya Vision, 29 novembre 2019, disponible sur https://www.aprsaf.org/annual_meetings/aprsaf26/pdf/outcome_documents/Nagoya_Vision.pdf (Consulté le 16 juin 2024).
  96. Convention relative à l’aviation civile internationale, 7 décembre 1944, art. 3.
    99; Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, Recueil des traités ONU VoL 1834, 1-31363, 10 décembre 1982, art. 29 et S., 107, 111, 224, 298, disponible sur https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_f.pdf.
  97. Loi relative aux opérations spatiales, op. cit., art. 11-1.
  98. Cour internationale de justice, Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucléaires, 8 juillet 1996, 95, Recueil des arrêts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances, 1996, § 29, disponible sur https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/95/095-19960708-ADV-01-00-FR.pdf (Consulté le 18 décembre 2022) ; « 32 – Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucléaires », in Les grandes décisions de la jurisprudence internationale, 1er éd., Grands arrêts, Paris, Dalloz, 2018, pp. 416‑440.
  99. Cf p. 13
  100. E. TEPPER, The big bang of space governance: towards decentralized regulation of space activities, Montréal, Faculty of Law, Institute of Air and Space Law McGill University, décembre 2019, disponible sur https://escholarship.mcgill.ca/downloads/4t64gs624?locale=en ; E. TEPPER, « The Big Bang of Space Governance: Towards Polycentric Governance of Space Activities », New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2022, vol. 54, n° 2, pp. 485‑558.
  101. E. TEPPER, « The Laws of Space Warfare: A Tale of Non-Binding International Agreements », Maryland Law Review, 2024, vol. 83, n° 2, pp. 458‑517, disponible sur https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3992&context=mlr.